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I have spent much of my academic career battling mandatory arbitration.1
As a junior law professor, horrified by the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision per-
mitting the practice in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,2 I drafted an
article arguing on policy grounds that companies ought not to be able to
deprive “little guys” of the opportunity to litigate their disputes.3  In subsequent
articles I continued to attack the phenomenon of mandatory arbitration from a
variety of policy, statutory, and constitutional perspectives.4  In addition to
* Michael and Sonja Saltman Professor of Law & Director of the Saltman Center for
Conflict Resolution, Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  I am most
grateful for the research assistance I received from Inku Nam, Koa Perlac, & Felicia
Quinlan; for the helpful comments I received from participants in the UNLV arbitration
symposium, including particularly Richard Reuben and Stephen Ware; from Tuan Samahon;
and for the financial support I received from Boyd School of Law.
1 Some, like Professor Stephen Ware, do not like the phrase “mandatory arbitration.”  How-
ever, I believe this phrase perfectly describes companies’ practice of requiring their consum-
ers and employees to submit future and yet unknown disputes to binding arbitration, rather
than to litigation. See Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration,
and State Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 43-44 (2003).
2 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (holding that Alabama’s
statute prohibiting mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses was preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act).  I was shocked that a termite extermination company could use an adhesive
small print contract to deprive its customers of all opportunity to litigate a breach of contract
claim against the company.
3 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s Prefer-
ence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996) [hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea
or Corporate Tool?].  “Little guys” was the phrasing I used to describe consumers, lower-
level employees, and perhaps certain franchisees and small businesses that could not be
expected to knowingly and voluntarily negotiate arbitration clauses in advance. Id. at 637-
39.
4 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Con-
sumer Class Actions:  Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004) (presenting economic arguments as to why mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses eliminating class actions are more likely to be abusive than economically effi-
cient); Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for
the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17 (2003) (presenting state constitutional jury trial argu-
ments that can be used to attack mandatory arbitration clauses); Jean R. Sternlight, Is the
U.S. Out on a Limb?:  Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employ-
ment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002) (pointing
out that the allowance of privately imposed mandatory binding arbitration is unique to the
United States); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the
82
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writing about mandatory arbitration, I have also given numerous talks on the
subject and participated in many panel discussions and debates on the pros and
cons of the practice.  After a while, the participants’ punches and counter-
punches become predictable.
Attack:  Critics like me attack mandatory arbitration as coerced and unfair,
often citing anecdotes showing the practice in its worst light.
Defense:  In response, defenders typically argue that while consumers/
employees may not like the sound or feel or actuality of mandatory arbitration,
such arbitration is nonetheless better for both them and society than is the alter-
native of litigation.5  Specifically, defenders often assert that arbitration is
quicker and cheaper than litigation and overall just as fair or fairer.6  Or,
defenders assert that the money companies save through imposing mandatory
arbitration is passed on to consumers/employees, who thereby benefit overall.7
Attack:  In response, critics like me state that if arbitration is so quick,
cheap, and fair, there is no need to impose it on a mandatory basis.  Let dispu-
tants select this wonderful dispute resolution process voluntarily, we say.8
Defense:  And then the defenders have responded that it is not practical to
make arbitration available only on a voluntary post-dispute basis because dis-
putants have a different set of incentives post-dispute.  It is said that consumers
and employees (or their lawyers?) would not want to arbitrate the good big $
cases, and companies would not want to arbitrate the weak low $ cases so in the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001)
(presenting Seventh Amendment arguments that might be used to attack mandatory binding
arbitration provisions); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000); Jean R.
Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions:  Federal Courts’ Use of Antisuit
Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1998) (examining and critiquing
federal courts’ use of anti-suit injunctions to support the enforcement of arbitration clauses);
Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due
Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight, Rethinking] (exploring
the extent to which Due Process and jury trial arguments might be used to attack mandatory
arbitration provisions).
5 Note that some also defend private mandatory arbitration on the theory that mandatory
arbitration really is voluntary and that enforcing such adhesive contracts promotes freedom
of contract. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault:  Trial Lawyers Lead the
Charge, CATO POL’Y ANALYSIS, at 1, 10 (April 18, 2002), available at http://www.cato.
org/pubs/pas/pa433.pdf.  I find this line of argument unpersuasive.
6 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws:  The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563
(2001); see also Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice:  Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 63-64 (1998) (arguing, in the employment con-
text, that arbitration may serve employees’ interests better than does litigation).
7 See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with Par-
ticular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 261 (2006).
8 E.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts:
A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1267-68 (2001); Sternlight, Panacea or Corpo-
rate Tool?, supra note 3, at 701-02.
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end, nothing would be arbitrated.  Thus, say the advocates, better to allow com-
panies to compel consumers/employees to arbitrate all cases, pre-dispute.9
In the past, my own typical response at this point in the argument has
essentially been a combination of “no it ain’t” and “that’s not fair.”  Specifi-
cally, I have questioned the premise that voluntary post-dispute arbitration will
not work, assuming that the proposed arbitration is fair.10  I have also urged
that even if privately mandating arbitration is the only way to ensure that dis-
putes are arbitrated rather than litigated, that does not justify the imposition of
mandatory arbitration on “little guys.”11  Thus, I have supported and continue
vigorously to endorse measures that would preclude companies from using
adhesive contracts to require their consumers and employees to resolve disputes
through binding arbitration rather than in court.  One such measure is the Arbi-
tration Fairness Act of 2007, recently introduced in both the House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate.12
Here I discuss an alternative response:  make arbitration mandatory for the
company, but not the “little guy.”  That is, assuming only for the sake of argu-
ment, that defenders of mandatory arbitration are correct that companies and
“little guys” won’t agree to arbitration post-dispute, in the same cases, and fur-
ther assuming only for the sake of argument that arbitration is socially more
desirable than litigation in many cases, perhaps we should impose arbitration
on companies in certain cases, rather than on consumers and employees?  As I
will explain infra,13 I believe it is more justifiable from a policy standpoint to
impose arbitration only on companies, rather than on “little guys” alone or on
both companies and “little guys.”
To try to minimize confusion, I will now offer two new terms to this dis-
cussion.  I will use the phrase “private mandatory arbitration” to describe the
kind of privately imposed arbitration that currently exists in the United States.
I will use the phrase “governmental mandatory arbitration” to describe the new
form of mandatory arbitration that I am discussing in this Article.  Also, note
that I will only be discussing the possibility of requiring arbitration in lieu of a
lawsuit to resolve a civil dispute, and not, for example, the imposition of so-
called “interest arbitration” in which arbitrators dictate contract terms to which
labor and management could not voluntarily agree.14
The remainder of this Article will explore three aspects of this deliberately
radical proposal for governmental mandatory arbitration:  (1) What is my idea?;
9 E.g., Estreicher, supra note 6, at 567-68 (describing voluntary pre-dispute arbitration as
“chimerical”).
10 Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1656-58 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration].
11 Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 3, at 696-97.
12 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong.
(2007).  This bill would amend the Federal Arbitration Act to include a provision stating:
“No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of
. . . an employment, consumer, of franchise dispute . . . .”  S. 1782 § 4; H.R. 3010 § 4.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 35-38.
14 For a discussion of interest arbitration, see, for example, Brian J. Malloy, Binding Interest
Arbitration in the Public Sector:  A “New” Proposal for California and Beyond, 55 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 245 (2003).
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(2) Is such a proposal desirable from a policy perspective?; and (3) Is such a
proposal feasible from a legal perspective, given existing constitutional and
other constraints?
II. WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO IMPOSE MANDATORY
ARBITRATION ON THE COMPANY?
At minimum the idea of mandating arbitration on the company is delicious
from a rhetorical perspective.  Having battled with certain able foes over the
years, regarding the fairness and legal legitimacy of private mandatory arbitra-
tion, I frankly look forward to the possibility of turning the tables.  For exam-
ple, I imagine that Alan Kaplinsky, a banking lawyer who has vigorously
defended the imposition of binding arbitration on consumers,15 will be far less
enthralled at the prospect of the government forcing binding arbitration on his
own clients, banks, and credit card issuers.16
The gist of my idea is that “little guys” (consumers and certain lower level
employees) would be provided, by statute, with an opportunity to take their
disputes to binding arbitration rather than litigation.  If the “little guys” chose
arbitration over litigation, post-dispute, companies would have to agree to such
arbitration, and the results of the arbitration would then be binding on both
“little guy” and company.17  If on the other hand the “little guys” preferred to
litigate their disputes, they would reserve that right.
I will now try to spell out this very basic idea in a bit more detail.  In
essence, my idea is that Congress would choose certain categories of disputes
to be eligible for this governmental mandatory arbitration program.  For exam-
15 See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, but Who’s the Predator?:
Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, BUS. L. TODAY, May-June 1998, at 24,
24, 26-28.
16 I am certain that Professor Stephen Ware, who views what I call “private mandatory
arbitration” as a legitimate product of free contracting, see Stephen J. Ware, supra note 7, at
253, will not be enthusiastic about the legislative imposition of arbitration on companies.
See Stephen J. Ware, What Makes Securities Arbitration Different from Other Consumer and
Employment Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (draft on file with author)
(“I believe governmental imposition of non-contractual duties to arbitrate is bad policy,
regardless of the victim’s status as a worker or a capitalist.”).
17 An alternative but similar idea would require both company and consumer to arbitrate
certain disputes but then make the result of such arbitration binding only if the consumer was
satisfied with the result of the arbitration.  That is, the consumer but not the company would
have the right to designate the arbitration as non-binding, subsequent to the issuance of the
award.  The Better Business Bureau handles arbitration in this fashion and calls this process
“conditionally binding” arbitration. BETTER BUS. BUREAU, RULES OF CONDITIONALLY BIND-
ING ARBITRATION (2003), available at http://www.dr.bbb.org/ComSenseAlt/CondBidRules.
asp.  Similarly, a bill recently introduced in the Senate would require long term insurance
plans to develop dispute resolution procedures that would allow enrollees but not insurance
issuers to appeal determinations made by non-court third parties as to disputed claims.
Long Term Care Insurance Integrity Act of 2007, S. 2268, 110th Cong. (2007).  My tentative
preference would be to allow consumers to opt in or out of the arbitration prior to the claim
having been heard by an arbitrator, rather than afterwards.  First, I believe it would be ineffi-
cient to require all disputes to be arbitrated in situations where a substantial number of
consumers/employees may then opt for a trial de novo.  Second, from a fairness perspective,
I am more comfortable requiring all disputants to elect a process pre-decision, rather than
providing one, but not both disputants with a post-decision veto.
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ple, Congress might provide that all “consumer” claims against companies for
breach of contract or fraud,18 or all company claims against consumers be eligi-
ble for arbitration, at the consumer’s option.19  With respect to employees,
Congress might decide that all employees earning less than a certain amount be
permitted to arbitrate claims against their employer pertaining to unpaid wages
or benefits, breach of contract, or discrimination.  Congress would decide how
to draw these lines based on its sense of the category of claims in which arbitra-
tion might be preferable from a societal perspective, but in which the company
might nonetheless refuse to arbitrate such claims.  As well, Congress would
need to consider the constitutional constraints that will be examined below.
With respect to how the arbitration would look, I can imagine four possi-
ble variants of this basic proposal.
Option 1:  Congress could establish and fund an arbitration process much
as it establishes and funds administrative law judges in a variety of areas.  In
this option, the arbitrators would be government employees, paid a salary by
the government, and statutes and rules would define the nature of the arbitra-
tion.20  This sort of publicly-funded arbitration is used in a number of other
countries.21  The advantage of Option 1 is that Congress would have maximum
control over the arbitration and be able to ensure that the process is one that
Congress approves.  One downside of Option 1 is that Congress would then
have to appropriate funds to administer and pay for these arbitrations.22  A
18 Such “consumer” claims might, for example, include claims brought against banks, credit
card issuers, phone providers, and homebuilders.  Potentially claims in the medical field, for
example, by patients against doctors, hospitals, or HMOs, could be eligible for such a pro-
gram as well.
19 Note that while the discussion of private mandatory arbitration typically focuses on
claims brought by consumers against companies, in reality, much of the private mandatory
arbitration taking place today is collections actions brought by companies against their cus-
tomers.  One credit card company, First USA, revealed that in the two years since it imple-
mented its mandatory arbitration clause in early 1998, only four consumers had filed
arbitration claims against the company.  In contrast, First USA itself filed 51,622 arbitration
claims against consumers in the same period. See Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose
Rarely?:  Arbitration Forum’s Rulings Called One-Sided, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at E1.
For a critique of the use of mandatory binding arbitration for collections purposes, see PUB.
CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP:  HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS
(2007), available at www.citizen.org/documents/final_wcover.pdf.
20 Such rules would presumably spell out matters including how arbitrators are selected,
where the arbitration takes place, whether the arbitration is live or based only on paper
evidence, what discovery is permitted, whether representation by attorneys is permitted,
whether arbitrations are open to the public, whether arbitration decisions are published, and
how arbitral awards might be vacated.  The rules could potentially be drafted by an appropri-
ate federal agency, rather than by Congress itself.
21 For example, Great Britain currently uses a system of industrial tribunals to resolve
employment disputes.  While not called “arbitration,” in essence this is the same sort of
program discussed here, in that panels include non-lawyers and use less formal procedures
than courts. See Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employ-
ment Discrimination Laws:  A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1430-34
(2004).  Some commentators have also proposed that Britain add a voluntary “arbitration”
scheme, where the arbitrators would be paid by the government. Id. at 1444-48.
22 It is unlikely that these expenses would be entirely offset by reductions in the funding
needed for federal courts.  First, as arbitrations would potentially reduce not only federal but
also state court filings, offering federally-funded arbitrations might reduce state judicial costs
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second downside of Option 1 is that it would be difficult either to specify a set
of rules that would work for all disputes or to allow for enough flexibility to
make such accommodations.
Option 2:  Congress could design an arbitration process that companies
would be required to offer to certain consumers, employees, or other “little
guys.”  In this variation, Congress would need to spell out, in some detail, vari-
ous features of the arbitration.23  An advantage of Option 2 is that Congress
would not need to commit to funding the arbitration process.  A second advan-
tage is that while Congress would need to spell out certain mandatory features
of the arbitration, it could leave other design aspects to the disputants.  How-
ever, one disadvantage of Option 2, from disputants’ perspective, is that indi-
viduals and companies would be paying for the arbitration rather than receiving
this service free of charge from the government.  A second potential disadvan-
tage is that as Congress would not be spelling out all the details of the process,
companies might devise a process that would not be desirable to “little guys.”24
Option 3:  Rather than designing an arbitration process Congress could,
instead, provide some basic constraints and allow companies to devise an arbi-
tration scheme so long as it fell within constraints.  This approach would be
somewhat similar to the current adoption of “due process protocols” by a num-
ber of private providers.25  Such protocols spell out certain fair features of arbi-
tration but, outside those limits, allow companies to design the arbitration as
they wish.26  An advantage of Option 3 is that it would preserve maximum
flexibility to companies that might therefore devise the most appropriate form
of arbitration for the dispute at hand.  But, as with Option 2, there is a risk that
companies would try, within the limits, to design a process that would be either
undesirable or unfair to the “little guy.”
Option 4:  Under this approach Congress would not impose any con-
straints but would instead allow the company complete flexibility to design the
proposed arbitration process.  The company could then offer the process to the
consumer/employee who could either accept or reject the process.  However,
while offering the advantage of minimal governmental intrusion and lower reg-
ulatory costs, this approach seems flawed in that a company that did not want
to arbitrate a particular dispute could just provide an obviously skewed or
costly process.
but not necessarily federal judicial costs.  Second, if disputants view arbitration as cheaper
and quicker than litigation, offering arbitration may allow some claims to be brought that
otherwise would have been ignored or settled.  This may be a good result, from a justice
perspective, but still means that Congress might incur additional costs.
23 Such features might include not only the features mentioned supra note 20, but also who
would pay how much for the arbitration.
24 For example, the company might devise a process that would be expensive.  Although
Congress could always craft legislation to restrict companies from imposing any particular
unfair term, it may be that companies will always be one jump ahead of Congress in coming
up with unfair terms.
25 See generally Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369 (2004).
26 Id. at 395-96.
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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF IMPOSING MANDATING
ARBITRATION ON THE COMPANY
Why might a staunch opponent of mandatory binding arbitration poten-
tially seek to impose binding arbitration of certain disputes on companies?  Or,
why might what is bad for the goose be good for the gander?  And, if it is
justifiable to impose arbitration on companies, why is it not equally justifiable
to impose arbitration on “little guys”?
First, as the defenders of private mandatory binding arbitration have
argued for years, I do recognize that American-style litigation is neither feasi-
ble nor desirable for all claims.  At least as structured in the United States,
litigation is often so expensive and time consuming that many potential claim-
ants are foreclosed from seeking relief for alleged legal violations.27  Defend-
ants, as well, are harmed by a system that costs them substantial time and
money, even when they are ultimately found not liable.
Second, I also agree with defenders of traditional binding arbitration that
arbitration can potentially be a better venue, from either or both disputants’
perspective, for resolving certain kinds of claims.  One particularly appealing
aspect of arbitration is that its procedures can be custom-tailored to the dispute
at hand.28  Such customization can potentially be beneficial to the “little guy,”
as well as to the larger company.29  Unfortunately, empirical evidence on how
mandatory private arbitration works out in practice is quite scant and is likely
to continue to be limited.30  For business reasons, to protect disputant confiden-
tiality, or perhaps even to cover up questionable practices, arbitration providers
have for the most part not been willing to open their files to researchers.  More-
over, those few studies that have been done leave many open questions.31  Yet,
27 See, e.g., DEBORAH  L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); Robert Rubinson, A Theory of
Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89 (2005).  As Samuel Estreicher has explained, our
“cadillac” version of litigation, with opportunities for substantial discovery, in-person hear-
ings, and appeals, may make sense for large dollar disputes, but not for smaller value dis-
agreements.  Estreicher, supra note 6, at 563-64.  Of course, disputes that don’t involve large
sums of money can also be important.
28 For example, evidentiary rules can be loosened or not; discovery can be extensive or not;
and hearings can be in-person or based solely on a paper record.  While it has recently been
suggested that litigation, too, can be customized, see Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litiga-
tion:  The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007),
it is easier and more accepted to customize arbitration than litigation.
29 For example, consumers and employees may benefit from having their disputes heard by
a neutral with particular subject matter expertise, by a neutral, who focuses more on fairness
than just law, in a process that can offer more privacy than the public court, and in a process
that can offer increased speed and decreased cost.
30 For an example of an article summarizing some of the empirical studies in the employ-
ment context, see Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38
U.S.F. L. REV. 105 (2003).
31 For example, studies of “win rates” often do not discuss how much is won.  Moreover,
studies of final results in arbitration do not reflect critically important prior events such as
the extent to which private mandatory arbitration discourages “little guys” from bringing
claims and the impact private mandatory arbitration has upon settlement and summary judg-
ment.  For a discussion of empirical studies and my frustrations therewith, see Sternlight,
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 10, at 1658-61. See also David Sherwyn,
Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration:  A
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I am certainly ready to believe that in particular situations arbitration can be
better for consumers, employees, and other “little guys” than litigation.  We
know, at least anecdotally, that consumers and employees do sometimes elect
to proceed voluntarily through arbitration.
Third, I also agree with some commentators’ point that although arbitra-
tion may sometimes be better for both parties, if analyzed pre-dispute, that post
dispute one or both parties may elect litigation.  This could happen because
arbitration may be attractive as a general matter but not for a particular dispute
that may arise.  Also, it may be true that arbitration is actually better for both
disputants, post-dispute, but that one or both nonetheless fails to see such bene-
fits and thus selects litigation.32
Fourth, I also recognize that one must separately analyze whether a partic-
ular dispute resolution process is better than alternatives for the disputants, and
whether it is better than alternatives for society-at-large.  Thus, even if two
fully informed disputants might, in a given dispute, prefer to litigate, it is con-
ceivable that an arbitral or other resolution might better serve the needs of the
society-at-large.33
Lest any may think I have entirely lost my bearings, of course I am not
claiming that binding arbitration is necessarily better for “little guys” than is
litigation.  My own belief remains that denying “little guys” their litigation
option and forcing them into arbitration, designed by the company, can often be
harmful to the “little guys.”  When the company has the opportunity to design
arbitration in any way it wants (subject only to occasional expensive court chal-
lenge) the company has the incentive to skew the arbitration process in its
favor.34
Nor do I believe that any potential benefits to society justify companies in
imposing mandatory arbitration on their customers, employees, or other “little
guys.”  Private companies are not the appropriate entity to determine whether
individual “little guys” should be disadvantaged, purportedly in the interest of
the greater good.  Further, in many instances the “little guys” may have consti-
tutional or statutory rights to litigate that should not be eliminated through pri-
vately imposed arbitration.
New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1564-66 (2005) (recognizing
difficulties in empirically comparing arbitration and litigation).
32 That is, as economists would put it, there can be an information failure. See, e.g., Maurits
Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with Sticky Defaults:
Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 83
(2005) (presenting “barriers” to resolution that may explain why disputants elect traditional
litigation over mediation or arbitration, even when such alternatives to litigation would be
more rational choice).  Also, to the extent that disputants are represented by attorneys, it is
possible that a particular form of dispute resolution (litigation) might be better for the attor-
ney, but not the client, and, thus, selected against the client’s best interest.  This would be an
example of an “agency” problem. See KENNETH ARROW ET AL., BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (1995); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:  NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 69-91 (2000).
33 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:  A Philosophical
and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2694-95 (1995).
34 Such skewing may be used to prevent or deter “little guys” from filing any claims at all,
and also to decrease their odds of prevailing, or winning much, in the event that they do
bring claims.
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Yet, I find myself wondering whether notwithstanding these concerns
mandatory arbitration might be fair and appropriate if imposed by the govern-
ment on the company.  Why the distinction between private and governmental
imposition of mandatory arbitration?  First, I am far less worried that compa-
nies will be taken advantage of, through governmental mandatory arbitration,
than that “little guys” might be disadvantaged in private mandatory arbitra-
tion.35  If arbitration is governmentally imposed, the government will presuma-
bly also design the arbitration itself, adopt rules on the design of the arbitration,
or provide the company with the opportunity to design the process.  Under any
of these variations, the company will receive far greater protections from a
potentially unfair process than “little guys” currently receive when the process
is designed and run by the companies.  Second, from a democratic standpoint I
am more comfortable with dispute resolution procedures imposed by an elected
Congress than by a single powerful company on its far less powerful customers
or employees.36  Presumably Congress would only adopt a governmental
mandatory arbitration program if it truly thought such a program would be fair
and just for the disputants and for society as a whole.  We cannot be sure that
privately imposed mandatory arbitration would be fair and just for all.
If Congress is to impose arbitration, why not impose it even-handedly,
rather than provide “little guys” with an opt out?  For me, the opt out is a
critical feature of the plan because it ensures that any arbitration scheme that is
created will be fair for the “little guys.”  If Congress or companies design an
unfair program, the “little guys” will consistently opt out of such a program.
Thus, even if companies are given a fair bit of discretion to design the arbitra-
tion program, the “free market” of the opt out will limit companies’ ability to
design a program that benefits themselves at “little guys’” expense.  Compa-
nies do not need such an opt out because they will likely play a greater role in
designing the program37 and because in general they are more knowledgeable
and sophisticated and more capable of representing their interests in any dis-
pute resolution process.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMPOSING MANDATORY
ARBITRATION ON COMPANIES
Assuming for the moment that imposing mandatory arbitration on compa-
nies is desirable, is it constitutional?  Some may assume not, but as one who
has fought an uphill battle to convince others that privately imposed arbitration
is unconstitutional, I am not sure the answer is so clear.  Below I will discuss
35 Whereas in private arbitration companies can design arbitration to give themselves an
advantage over “little guys,” governmental mandatory arbitration would either be designed
by the government or designed by the companies themselves.  Even assuming the process
were to be designed by the government, rather than the company, I am confident that compa-
nies have sufficient legislative clout to ensure that the process would not be rigged against
them.
36 Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 10, at 1673-75.
37 Under Option 1, see supra text accompanying notes 20-22, this point would not apply, as
Congress would do all the design work.  However, I believe that it is not likely Congress
would take on the burden and expense of fully designing and funding an arbitration process.
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constitutional attacks that might be made under Article III,38 the Seventh
Amendment,39 and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution40 if Con-
gress sought to impose mandatory arbitration on companies.41  I do not claim
that these attacks are the only viable arguments, but they do seem to me the
most plausible.  Potentially challenges might also be made under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause42 or under the Appointments Clause, but such challenges will
not be discussed in depth in this Article.43
A. Article III
If Congress were to impose mandatory arbitration on companies, it is
likely some would contend that such a statute deprived them of the right to
bring or defend such claims in federal court, in front of an Article III judge.
While the question of the extent to which Congress can mandate non-judicial
fora has arisen repeatedly, in our heavily administrative state, the line of cases
defining the rules in this area remains muddled.44  In general the Supreme
38 See infra Part IV.A.
39 See infra Part IV.B.
40 See infra Part IV.C.
41 I will not attempt to address what state constitutional provisions might impede states from
imposing mandatory arbitration on companies, though presumably the analysis is fairly simi-
lar.  For a now somewhat outdated discussion of whether states constitutionally may impose
binding arbitration to deal with medical malpractice claims, see Martin H. Redish, Legisla-
tive Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:  Constitutional Implications, 55
TEX. L. REV. 759, 796-99 (1977) (concluding that some state-imposed mandatory arbitration
schemes in the medical malpractice arena have survived and may in the future survive con-
stitutional attack).
42 If companies were to contend that mandating companies but not individuals to participate
in binding arbitration violates Equal Protection, I believe a court would reject the challenge
on the ground that distinguishing between companies and “little guys” passes muster under a
rational basis analysis. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)
(“[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of
legislative choices.  In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be
upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”).
43 The Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, provides that “Officers of the United
States” must be appointed by the President “with Advice and Consent of the Senate,” but
that “inferior Officers” may be appointed by agency heads.  It has been argued in several
cases that NAFTA arbitration violates the “appointments clause,” but to date no reported
decision has made a ruling on the merits on this issue. See, e.g., Coalition for Fair Lumber
Imps. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (dismissing complaint
for lack of jurisdiction).  I doubt the Court would find arbitrators required advice and consent
of the Senate, particularly if they were appointed on a short-term rather than a continuing
basis. See 31 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, slip op. at 1, 34 (Apr. 16, 2007), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/2007/appointmentsclausev10.pdf (stating that only positions which are
both “invested by legal authority with a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal Gov-
ernment” and “continuing” are subject to the appointments clause, and opining that “the
federal Government’s participation in binding arbitration ordinarily does not raise an
Appointments Clause problem”).
44 See e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Arti-
cle III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 916 (1988); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III
Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 647 (2004)
(“Scholars have searched, with mixed success, for an organizing and limiting principle in the
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Court has proved willing to permit uses of “legislative courts,”45 government
agencies, and “adjuncts”46 in lieu of Article III courts, in some circumstances,
for example because “public rights” are at stake,47 because there is sufficient
review by Article III courts,48 or based on historical exceptions.49
Clearly, statutorily imposed arbitration can be consistent with Article III.
The Supreme Court so held in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co.,50 in 1985.  In that case, a set of companies challenged a provision of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”)51 that required
pesticide manufacturers to arbitrate disputes regarding who should pay for cer-
tain research.52  They contended that “Article III bars Congress from requiring
arbitration of disputes among registrants concerning compensation under
FIFRA without also affording substantial review by tenured judges of the arbi-
trator’s decisions.”53  In upholding the constitutional validity of the FIFRA
mandatory arbitration scheme, the Court stated:
somewhat muddled jurisprudence that governs the relationship between Article III courts
and Article I tribunals.”); Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh
Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1043 (1999) (“[T]he Court’s Article III jurisprudence is
incomplete, inconsistent, and, at times, nearly incomprehensible.”).
45 E.g., Fallon, supra note 44, at 921-22 (discussing the Supreme Court’s approval of uses
of territorial courts, courts martial, court of claims, federal tax court, customs court, etc.);
Sward, supra note 44, at 1040.  Note that Professor Sward uses the term “legislative court”
much more broadly than does Professor Fallon, and includes administrative agencies and
adjuncts in her definition of legislative courts. Id. at 1043.
46 Fallon, supra note 44, at 923-25, explains that “adjuncts” are entities, including adminis-
trative agencies, that make certain determinations but leave the essential attributes of the
decision with the courts.
47 Professor Fallon states that the first justification, historically, for allowing disputes to be
resolved administratively was the public rights doctrine.  He notes that in its first session the
first Congress provided that certain disputes, including those involving veterans’ benefits
and custom duties, were sent to executive officers in the Treasury Department. Id. at 919.
The rationale, as Professor Fallon admits “[c]rudely stated,” was that “some disputes about
the proper application of law to fact—mostly, although not invariably, associated with the
doctrine of sovereign immunity—do not require judicial resolution . . . .” Id.
48 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51-52 (1932) (permitting federal administra-
tive agency to make factual determinations and issue an initial legal decision, so long as final
decision remained in a federal court’s hands); see also Sward, supra note 44, at 1044-45
(providing examples of adjuncts, such as magistrate judges, who operate under supervision
of federal district court judges).
49 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-76 (1982) (plu-
rality opinion) (identifying a series of “historical exceptions” to literal interpretations of Arti-
cle III, including territorial courts, military tribunals, and non-article III adjudication of
public rights cases).
50 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
51 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (current
version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000)).
52 According to the pesticide registration portion of FIFRA, manufacturers were required to
submit research data to the Environmental Protection Agency regarding the nature of their
product.  The Act included provisions requiring data sharing among manufacturers and also
mandated that later applicants compensate earlier submitters for a portion of their costs.  If
the compensation could not be negotiated, the statute provided that such disputes be resolved
through binding arbitration.  The arbitrators’ decisions were to be final and conclusive and
could be reviewed only in a narrow set of circumstances including allegations of fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571-74.
53 Id. at 582.
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[We have] long recognized that Congress is not barred from acting pursuant to its
powers under Article I to vest decisionmaking authority in tribunals that lack the
attributes of Article III courts.  Many matters that involve the application of legal
standards to facts and affect private interests are routinely decided by agency action
with limited or no review by Article III courts.54
The Thomas Court’s explanation for why the FIFRA arbitration scheme
passed muster is rather complex.  The Court explicitly rejected using any sort
of bright-line test, such as between public and private rights, instead asserting
“[t]he enduring lesson of Crowell is that practical attention to substance rather
than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of
Article III.”55  Describing its own holding, the Thomas Court, approving the
FIFRA mandatory arbitration, stated:
Our holding is limited to the proposition that Congress, acting for a valid legis-
lative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a
seemingly “private” right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme
as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the
Article III judiciary.  To hold otherwise would be to erect a rigid and formalistic
restraint on the ability of Congress to adopt innovative measures such as negotiation
and arbitration with respect to rights created by a regulatory scheme.56
In a subsequent decision, Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor,57 the Court made clear that its reasoning in Thomas was no fluke.  The
Schor Court held that Article III was not violated by providing a government
agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), jurisdiction to
decide a state law cause of action brought by a commodities broker as a coun-
terclaim to the customer’s fraud claim.58  Once again the Court espoused a
balancing methodology.59  In short, as one commentator put it, “congressional
54 Id. at 583 (citations omitted) (citing cases approving decision making by government
agencies, administrators, and non-Article III courts).
55 Id. at 587 (referring to Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)); see also id. at 583-87
(rejecting “absolutist” constructions of Article III and asserting that the bright-line test
espoused by some in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982), did not command a majority of the court).  The Thomas Court construed
Northern Pipeline narrowly, stating:
The Court’s holding in that case establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional
contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordi-
nary appellate review.
Id. at 584. Crowell, cited favorably by Thomas, is a case in which the Court upheld agency
adjudication of federal workers’ compensation claims under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, even though the disputes were between two private parties.
The Court emphasized that the agency would have to enforce its orders in an Article III court
where there would be de novo review. Crowell, 285 U.S. 22.
56 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593-94.
57 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
58 One aspect of Schor may be distinguishable in future cases.  In considering whether the
grant of agency jurisdiction violated a disputant’s personal rights, in contrast to more sys-
temic concerns, Justice O’Connor emphasized that Mr. Schor “indisputably waived any right
he may have possessed” to have the claim heard by an Article III court. Id. at 849.  To the
extent that companies challenging governmental arbitration could not be found to have
waived their rights, they might succeed where Mr. Schor failed.
59 In particular, the Court enunciated that Article III decisions should take into account a
series of factors including the following:
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interests in providing for administrative adjudication must be weighed against
‘the purposes underlying the requirements of Article III.’”60
In light of Thomas and Schor, and given the great similarities between
governmental mandatory arbitration and agency decisions, it seems that Article
III will not pose an insurmountable burden to legislatively mandating use of
binding arbitration for certain disputes.  Of course there are limits.  Congress
surely could not legitimately require that all private disputes, such as torts and
breaches of contract, be resolved through binding arbitration rather than in
court.61  However, if Congress were to require that certain statutory consumer
protection claims be resolved through binding arbitration rather than in court, I
suspect that such a statute could pass muster.  Or, if Congress were to specify
that particular statutory employment claims, such as those regarding fair labor
standards or discrimination, be resolved through arbitration, I don’t think Arti-
cle III would stand in the way.  In reviewing a challenge to such statutes, the
Court would likely be persuaded that such statutes imposed a public regulatory
scheme and that the enforcement scheme devised was appropriate to resolve
such claims.  As Justice O’Connor stated on behalf of the majority in Thomas,
the use of innovative alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitra-
tion and negotiation can be very beneficial.62
Moreover, even if some members of the Court might balk at resolving
such statutory claims through arbitration, rather than in court, they might be
convinced to accept the use of arbitration if at least some form of appeal to a
court from the arbitration were available.  A number of the Court’s decisions
have accepted the use of non-Article III courts so long as determinations might
be reviewed in court.63  Based on the Court’s jurisprudence it seems like any
the extent to which the ‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to Article III courts,
. . . the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers
normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudi-
cated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.
Id. at 851.
60 Fallon, supra note 44, at 931 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 847).  Waiver analysis also
played a substantial role in the Schor decision, as the Court emphasized that any individual
interests the customer had in retaining the right to an Article III forum had been waived.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 848-50.
61 Such decisions as Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 73-74 (1982), make clear that the Court remains highly protective of non-statutory
private claims.  Indeed, in Schor the Court implied it would find an Article III violation if
“Congress created a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire busi-
ness of the Article III courts without any Article III supervision or control and without
evidence of valid and specific legislative necessities,” even if “the parties had the election to
proceed in their forum of choice . . . .” Schor, 478 U.S. at 855.
62 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985).
63 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 64 (1932) (emphasizing availability of judicial
review as critical to constitutionality of agency decisions). But see N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
86-87 & n.39 (finding grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges violated Article III, even
though bankruptcy judges’ decisions could be appealed, and stating that “[o]ur precedents
make it clear that the constitutional requirements for the exercise of the judicial power must
be met at all stages of adjudication, and not only on appeal, where the court is restricted to
considerations of law, as well as the nature of the case as it has been shaped at the trial
level”). See also Pfander, supra note 44, at 647-48 (discussing appellate review justification
for use of non-Article III courts, but stating that “the appellate review theory does not fit
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necessary appellate review would not need to be very thorough to pass muster
under Article III.  In Thomas, although the Court noted the availability of
appellate review,64 the review that was available was extremely limited and
only permitted arbitrators’ decisions to be overturned for fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or other misconduct by a party or arbitrator.65  At minimum, Congress
could easily make such limited review a part of any legislatively imposed
arbitration.
B. Seventh Amendment Jury Trial Right
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that dispu-
tants in certain types of situations cannot be denied their right to a civil jury
trial, absent their consent.66  This guarantee limits the government’s right to
mandate binding arbitration statutorily but does not entirely foreclose that
option.
Because the Seventh Amendment only affords a jury right to claims
brought in federal court, at “common law,” for amounts in excess of $20,67 at
minimum it is clear that federal legislation would not violate the Seventh
Amendment if it prescribed arbitration only for claims not brought “at common
law.”68  Over the years the Supreme Court has wrestled to define which claims
are and are not “at common law” such that the jury trial right must be pre-
served.  It has explained that the definition has both historical and functional
dimensions, but that the latter are more important.69  Specifically, when a stat-
ute provides remedies such as punitive or compensatory damages, that were
typically available at common law, disputants are entitled to a jury trial.70
Thus, at minimum Congress could mandate that equitable claims be resolved
through arbitration without impinging on the Seventh Amendment.
particularly well with many of the accepted features of the Court’s Article I and Article III
jurisprudence”).
64 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584.
65 Id. at 574 n.1.
66 It states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
67 Id.
68 It is also true that the Seventh Amendment would not prevent Congress from mandating
binding arbitration for claims that otherwise would have been brought in state court, or for
claims brought for $20 or less.  However, as the possibility of supplemental jurisdiction
makes it virtually impossible to predict where claims will be brought, and as it seems equally
impossible to predict which claims will have little or no dollar amount, these limits will not
help much with the crafting of federally mandated arbitration.
69 See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1990).  Note that
even though an entire claim is subject to jury trial, the Court has also held that portions of
the claim may be appropriate for resolution exclusively by a court. E.g., Markman v. West-
view Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377, 384 (1996) (holding that whereas patent infringe-
ment actions must be tried to a jury, the construction of a patent is “a question of law, to be
determined by the court”).
70 See, e.g., Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97-98 (1991).
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A relatively recent line of precedent opens up a much more promising way
to impose binding arbitration statutorily without violating the Seventh Amend-
ment.71  In 1977, in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission,72 the Court began to blend its analyses under Article III and the
Seventh Amendment, holding that by sending certain matters to non-Article III
courts, Congress could also elude the strictures of the Seventh Amendment.73
The Atlas Roofing Court found that requiring certain OSHA claims to be heard
by an administrative agency did not unconstitutionally deprive the company of
its right to a jury trial because the rights at issue were “public” rather than
“private.”74  Clearly, much will turn on the definitions of “public” and “pri-
vate” rights.  However, as discussed below, it is conceivable that the Court’s
use of non-Article III fora to loosen the Seventh Amendment restriction may
even reach into areas beyond “public rights.”  While the scope of this new way
around the Seventh Amendment is both confusing and unclear,75 at minimum
the viability of mandatory statutory arbitration has become more plausible.
Atlas Roofing itself defined the term “public rights” in a fairly narrow way
that might not offer Congress much opportunity to mandate arbitration without
offending the Seventh Amendment.76  However, subsequent decisions have
71 Note that I am not endorsing the Court’s recent blending of Article III and Seventh
Amendment analysis, but only attempting to discern how this jurisprudence would apply to
mandatory statutory arbitration.
72 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442
(1977).
73 A number of respected critics have attacked the Court’s blending of the Article III and
Seventh Amendment analyses. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings:  A Study in Dysfunctional
Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 408-09 (1995) (calling the Court’s
approach “indefensible as a matter of Seventh Amendment construction,” “inconsistent with
the principles of judicial review embodied in Marbury v. Madison,” and “in violation of the
fundamental precepts of constitutional democracy”); Sward, supra note 44, at 1043 (urging
that while the Court’s blended analysis is flawed both because the Article III jurisprudence
itself is “nearly incomprehensible” and because the Court has failed adequately to consider
the separate history, policy, and language of the Seventh Amendment, it may nonetheless be
pragmatic to retain the status quo).
74 Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450.
75 See, e.g., Redish & La Fave, supra note 73, at 409-10 (“Purely as a practical matter, it is
clear that when the dust settles, in most cases Congress possesses ultimate authority to deny
the jury trial right by transferring adjudication to a non-Article III forum.  The Court, how-
ever, has achieved this end by resorting to convoluted, unpredictable, and virtually Byzan-
tine doctrinal contortions that will require, in future cases, a great deal of judicial time and
effort in order to resolve the Seventh Amendment issue.”); Sward, supra note 44, at 1089-
90; see also Redish & La Fave, supra note 73, at 428-29 (“[T]he public rights doctrine, at
least when applied in the Seventh Amendment context, is fundamentally incoherent.”).
76 Atlas Roofing stated:
At least in cases in which “public rights” are being litigated—e.g., cases in which the Govern-
ment sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes within the power
of Congress to enact—the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the
factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury
would be incompatible.
Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450.  The Court relied on a similar narrow definition in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-68 (1982) (allowing
Congress to vest federal adjudicatory power in non-Article III bodies for claims of “public
right,” specifically “matters arising ‘between the Government and persons subject to its
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apparently broadened the term, as we have already seen in the Article III por-
tion of this Article.77  Specifically, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co.,78 in text quoted earlier, rejected an Article III attack on required
FIFRA arbitration of a dispute between two companies, stating that Congress
may use its Article I powers to create a “seemingly ‘private’ right” that is none-
theless so closely intertwined with a “public regulatory scheme” as to permit
resolution by an administrative agency with limited judicial involvement.79
Even more powerfully, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor80
the Court, in permitting mandatory agency adjudication of a breach of contract
claim brought by a broker against its client, explained that the dividing line
between claims of public and private right is largely “pragmatic.”81
While Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg82 did find a Seventh Amendment
violation, holding that where a bankruptcy trustee sued a party in bankruptcy
court with respect to a “private right” the respondent was entitled to a jury
trial,83 even that decision draws the public/private distinction in a way that may
leave Congress some broad powers to impose mandatory arbitration.84  Specifi-
cally, rejecting the narrow Atlas Roofing definition of “public rights” as limited
only to claims brought by the government,85 Granfinanciera, in multiple parts
of the opinion, stated that “public rights” claims are also those where the fed-
eral government, acting for a valid legislative purpose, has created a seemingly
private right that is closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme.86
authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive
or legislative departments’” (quoting Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932))).
77 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
78 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
79 Id. at 593-94.
80 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
81
“[T]he public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when Congress
selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that could be conclusively determined by
the Executive and Legislative Branches, the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers” is
less than when private rights, which are normally within the purview of the judiciary, are rele-
gated as an initial matter to administrative adjudication.
Id. at 853-54 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589 (internal citation omitted)).  Commentator
Ellen Sward tries to make sense of this expansion of the public rights doctrine, creating a
new category of “quasi-public” rights whereby “Congress creates a new regulatory right but
allows private parties to enforce that right against other private parties . . . .”  Sward, supra
note 44, at 1077.
82 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
83 Id. at 51-52.  The Court found that a person who had not submitted a claim against a
bankruptcy estate had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial when sued by the bank-
ruptcy trustee to recover an allegedly fraudulent conveyance. Id. at 36.
84 For a similar analysis see Redish & La Fave, supra note 73, at 426 (“It is . . . by no means
clear, on the basis of Granfinanciera, that ultimately Congress is truly restricted in its power
to remove a jury trial from a non-Article III proceeding, even in the case of a private right
adjudication.”).
85 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53 (“Our case law makes plain, however, that the class of
‘public rights’ whose adjudication Congress may assign to administrative agencies or courts
of equity sitting without juries is more expansive than Atlas Roofing’s discussion
suggests.”).
86 Id. at 54, 55 n.10.  The Court goes on to find the fraudulent conveyance claim to be
“private” in this sense, explaining:
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Moreover, at one point the Granfinanciera opinion can be read to imply
that even if Congress were to impinge on a traditionally private right, such
interference with Seventh Amendment rights might sometimes be acceptable
for pragmatic reasons.87  Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan explained that
the Court owes Congress deference in circumstances in which it has given care-
ful consideration to the constitutionality of a legislative provision.88  The Court
explained that sometimes jury trials may be problematic, in that they seriously
interfere with a chosen statutory scheme.89
Given this body of case law, it seems clear that Congress may mandate the
use of binding arbitration in some circumstances without violating the Seventh
Amendment.  Indeed, in 1980 Congress passed the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPAA”),90 which required employers to arbitrate
disputes over liability for withdrawal from multiemployer pension plans.91
Numerous federal appellate courts have held, citing Atlas Roofing, that the
MPAA does not violate the Seventh Amendment because “Congress may
The decisive point is that in neither the 1978 Act nor the 1984 Amendments did Congress
“creat[e] a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law”. . . .
Congress cannot eliminate a party’s Seventh Amendment right . . . merely by relabeling the
cause of action . . . and placing exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative agency or a specialized
court of equity.
Id. at 60-61 (quoting Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
430 U.S. 442, 461 (1977)).
87 Other commentators have reached this same conclusion, while also noting that the
Granfinanciera analysis is confusing. See Redish & La Fave, supra note 73, at 427 (“Jus-
tice Brennan’s words create a reasonable inference that had Congress made careful consider-
ation of the Seventh Amendment right before directing that jury trials not be used in the
adjudication of fraudulent conveyance actions, or had the Court been convinced that jury
trials were, in fact, ‘incompatible’ with the legislative scheme, Congress’s decision to aban-
don the jury trial right would have been constitutionally acceptable.”); see also Sward, supra
note 44, at 1095 n.298, 1096 (observing that the Granfinanciera Court “was never very clear
about the reasons for its decision” and that Granfinanciera “muddies both the Article III and
the Seventh Amendment waters to a considerable degree”).
88 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 61.
89 Id.  However in Granfinanciera, finding both that Congress had not focused on the possi-
ble unconstitutionality of the bankruptcy provision and that permitting a jury trial would not
be incompatible with the chosen bankruptcy process, the Court found further justification
(beyond the private rights analysis) for mandating use of a jury. Id. at 61-62.
90 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat.
1208.
91 Under the Act, if an employer withdrew from multiemployer pension plans, the plan
would determine how much if any money that employer owed to fund its portion of
“unfunded vested benefits.”  29 U.S.C. § 1381(a)-(b) (1982) (imposing liability); § 1393(c)
(defining “unfunded vested benefits”).  If the employer was dissatisfied with the plan’s rul-
ing it could arbitrate in front of a panel that would reverse the plan’s ruling only upon a
finding that the plan’s ruling was unreasonable or erroneous by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.  § 1401(a)(3)(A).  The arbitration ruling itself could be challenged in federal court, by
either party, under a quite limited standard of review.  § 1401(c).  For general discussion of
the Acts and challenges to the arbitration provision, see John R. Allison, The Context,
Properties, and Constitutionality of Nonconsensual Arbitration:  A Study of Four Systems,
1990 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 24-43.  Professor Allison discusses courts’ appellate review of
MPAA arbitral decisions at pages 28-29.
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assign to a nonjudicial forum the authority to initially adjudicate claims derived
from ‘statutory public rights’ which it has created.”92
If the MPAA passes Seventh Amendment muster, in what other contexts
might Congress legitimately mandate binding arbitration?93  Might Congress
require that certain consumer protection claims, such as those brought under the
Magnuson-Moss Act,94 be resolved through an administrative scheme of bind-
ing arbitration rather than in court?  While companies would no doubt argue
that such claims were private in nature, and closely analogous to breach of
contract or fraud claims brought at common law, I think it is conceivable that
courts would find Congress had created a new statutory right with its own stat-
utory enforcement scheme.95
Or, might Congress revise civil rights legislation to provide that all claims
for employment discrimination must be heard by arbitrators, rather than in
court?96  In this author’s opinion at least some courts would find that because
claims for employment discrimination did not exist at common law, and
because Congress had set up an entirely non-court enforcement process, the
Seventh Amendment argument would fail.97  Defenders of such a statute would
92 Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 724 F.2d 1247, 1277 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Bd.
of Trs. of W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Thompson Bldg. Materials,
Inc., 749 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1984); Wash. Star Co. v. Int’l Typographical Union
Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Textile Workers Pension
Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 855 (2d Cir. 1984).
93 One student commentator has argued that the Atlas Roofing Seventh Amendment argu-
ment can even be used to justify companies’ contractual imposition of mandatory arbitration.
Andrew M. Kepper, Note, Contractual Waiver of Seventh Amendment Rights:  Using the
Public Rights Doctrine to Justify a Higher Standard of Waiver for Jury-Waiver Clauses than
for Arbitration Clauses, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1345 (2006).  He urges that contractually imposed
arbitration clauses are “closely integrated into a federal regulatory scheme,”—the FAA—
and thus justified despite the Seventh Amendment under an Atlas Roofing analysis. Id. at
1358-59.  While I am not convinced that the FAA qualifies as a federal regulatory scheme, I
do believe that elements of Kepper’s analysis support the arguments spelled out here.
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000).
95 The Magnuson-Moss Act is mentioned by name only because it is a well-known piece of
consumer legislation.  This argument could potentially be applied to any existing or future
piece of consumer-protection legislation in which Congress chose to allow consumers to
bring claims through an arbitration process, rather than in court.
96 For many years prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1990, Title VII only allowed
for a bench trial, and not a jury trial.  The Supreme Court never ruled on the question of
whether, under the Seventh Amendment, Title VII plaintiffs must be afforded a jury trial.
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974) (raising but not resolving question of
whether the Seventh Amendment mandated jury trial for claims brought under Title VII).
However, even were it unconstitutional to deprive litigants in court of their right to jury trial,
courts might plausibly find that an entirely non-court enforcement mechanism, such as
mandatory arbitration, would justify elimination of the jury trial.  For a parallel analysis see
Textile Workers, 725 F.2d at 855 (contrasting MPAA, in which Congress established a
detailed non-court procedure for resolving pension liability, to the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
which provided housing discrimination claims should be brought in court).
97 Persons seeking a jury trial under such a hypothetical federal statute would no doubt cite
Curtis, 415 U.S. 189, in which the Court held that the Seventh Amendment mandated a jury
trial for federal court private damage suits alleging housing discrimination.  However, that
decision might be distinguished in many ways, including that the new statute would have
created an entirely non-court enforcement mechanism.
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likely cite NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,98 in which the Court
approved use of an administrative non-jury process to resolve union members’
unfair labor practice claims.99  In deciding Curtis v. Loether,100 in which it
mandated use of a jury trial to resolve damages claims brought in court for acts
of housing discrimination, the Court distinguished NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel.  It explained:  “Jones & Laughlin merely stands for the proposition that
the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceed-
ings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of admin-
istrative adjudication and would substantially interfere with the NLRB’s role in
the statutory scheme.”101  Because, in my hypotheticals, Congress would be
setting up a new enforcement procedure, outside the courts, I believe there is a
good likelihood that courts would find such governmental mandatory arbitra-
tion permissible under the Seventh Amendment.
C. Due Process
In order to prevail on a Due Process argument, companies would need to
show that the state had deprived them of “life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”102  With respect to private mandatory arbitration, such an
argument has typically floundered on the “state action” requirement.  Despite
the efforts of this author and others,103 courts have typically found that no state
action exists.104  Here however, since the arbitration I discuss in this Article
would be statutorily imposed, it seems clear that state action would exist.
Assuming that state action exists, one must also ask whether the imposi-
tion of arbitration as a substitute for litigation would potentially infringe on a
protected interest in life, liberty, or property.  Given that the Court, in Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co.,105 has stated that “a cause of action is a species of
98 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
99 In rejecting the Seventh Amendment attack, the Court also stated:
The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit.  The proceeding is
one unknown to the common law.  It is a statutory proceeding.  Reinstatement of the employee
and payment for time lost are requirements imposed for violation of the statute and are remedies
appropriate to its enforcement.  The contention under the Seventh Amendment is without merit.
Id. at 48-49.
100 Curtis, 415 U.S. 189.
101 Id. at 194 (footnote omitted).
102 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.  If the legislation mandating arbitration was federal,
the relevant Due Process Clause would be that contained in the Fifth Amendment, and, if the
legislation mandating arbitration was contained in a state statute, the court would properly
look to the Fourteenth Amendment.  Both clauses prohibit the taking of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law.
103 See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:  Toward a State Action Theory of Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 631-41 (1997) (arguing that privately imposed
arbitration is sufficiently entangled with public courts to give rise to state action); Sternlight,
Rethinking, supra note 4, at 40-47 (arguing that privately imposed arbitration may give rise
to state action, particularly where courts employ a jurisprudence that favors arbitration over
litigation). But see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1,
2-3 (arguing that privately imposed mandatory arbitration does not give rise to state action).
104 See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1200-03 (9th Cir.
1998).
105 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding that court’s dismissal of
complainant’s employment discrimination complaint as untimely violated the Due Process
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property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,”106
the only real question seems to be whether the particular form of binding arbi-
tration that is imposed is sufficient to protect the property right disputants hold
in their cause of action.107  That is, “what process is due”?108  Does the man-
dated arbitration provide sufficient process to comport with the Constitution?
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Due Process is a flexible con-
cept,109 and that the Due Process Clause does not mandate a particular or even
an adversarial process.  For example, in Walters v. National Association of
Radiation Survivors,110 the Court examined a statutorily created administrative
process that applied to veterans seeking benefits for a service-related disability.
The veterans argued that they needed attorney representation to have a decent
shot at retaining or obtaining benefits, and that the antiquated $10 restriction on
total payments to claimant attorneys therefore deprived the veterans of the
rights to Due Process.111  However, the Court rejected the claim, reasoning that
the government had deliberately established an informal non-adversarial pro-
cess for submitting disability claims and that such a process was sufficient to
pass constitutional muster.112  Indeed, the Court opined that allowing veterans
more access to attorney representation might ultimately harm veterans’
interests:
It is scarcely open to doubt that if claimants were permitted to retain compensated
attorneys the day might come when it could be said that an attorney might indeed be
necessary to present a claim properly in a system rendered more adversary and more
complex by the very presence of lawyer representation.  It is only a small step
beyond that to the situation in which the claimant who has a factually simple and
obviously deserving claim may nonetheless feel impelled to retain an attorney simply
Clause, where complainant had met deadlines and untimeliness of hearing was attributable to
actions of government agency).
106 Id. at 428.
107 The Court often refers to the “familiar two-part inquiry” to determine whether a person
was deprived of a protected right and, if so, what process was due. E.g., id. at 428.
108 Id. at 433.
109 E.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1985) (“Our
decisions establish that ‘due process’ is a flexible concept—that the processes required by
the Clause with respect to the termination of a protected interest will vary depending upon
the importance attached to the interest and the particular circumstances under which the
deprivation may occur.”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“[D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (quot-
ing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))). See generally Henry J. Friendly,
“Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
110 Walters, 473 U.S. 305.
111 Id. at 308.
112 The Court stated:
As might be expected in a system which processes such a large number of claims each year, the
process prescribed by Congress for obtaining disability benefits does not contemplate the adver-
sary mode of dispute resolution utilized by courts in this country.  It is commenced by the sub-
mission of a claim form to the local veterans agency . . . .  Upon application a claim generally is
first reviewed by a three-person “rating board” of the VA regional office—consisting of a medi-
cal specialist, a legal specialist, and an “occupational specialist.” . . .  Proceedings in front of the
rating board “are ex parte in nature”; no Government official appears in opposition. . . .  The
board is required by regulation “to assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to his
claim” . . . .
Id. at 309-10 (citation omitted).
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because so many other claimants retain attorneys.  And this additional complexity
will undoubtedly engender greater administrative costs, with the end result being that
less Government money reaches its intended beneficiaries.113
The well-known case of Mathews v. Eldridge114 provides further support
for the idea that the Due Process Clause does not mandate particular court-like
procedures.  In that decision, reviewing the termination of governmental disa-
bility benefits, the Court held that Due Process did not require a pre-termina-
tion hearing.  In so holding the Court explained that “[t]he judicial model of an
evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of
decisionmaking in all circumstances.”115
Similarly, while the Court clearly has a great deal of faith in the procedu-
ral benefits of adjudicative systems,116 in many situations it has found that
disputes can be heard by persons other than judges117 and that not all typical
courtroom protections must be afforded in all contexts.  For example, the Court
has accepted as consistent with Due Process an inquiry by a staff physician to
determine whether parents should be able to commit a child to a state mental
health facility;118 a determination by a staff member that a patient is competent
before she is allowed to voluntarily commit herself to a state mental health
facility;119 a mere post-deprivation hearing before a Social Security Adminis-
tration administrative law judge to determine whether social security disability
or welfare benefits had appropriately been terminated;120 an informal hearing
by school officials to determine whether a student’s suspension would be justi-
113 Id. at 326.
114 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
115 Id. at 348.
116 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), is perhaps the best example of the Court’s
occasional enthusiasm for adversarial processes.  In that case the Court held that welfare
benefits could not constitutionally be terminated unless the recipient were provided with
notice and a pre-termination hearing. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.8, at 630 (7th ed. 2004) (“The Court has demon-
strated a consistent belief that the adversary process is best designed to safeguard individual
rights against arbitrary action by the government.”).  Some have questioned whether the
Court is correct to focus so heavily on adversary procedures. E.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Management Side of Due Process:  Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance
of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974) (urging that expert decision making with managerial oversight
may prove better than adversarial procedures in protecting individual rights); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 5 (1996) (“[T]he adversary system may no longer be the best
method for our legal system to deal with all of the matters that come within its purview.”).
117 Indeed Professor Judith Resnik has pointed out that the vast majority of adjudicatory
decisions made in this country are now being issued by agency personnel or administrative
law judges, rather than traditional courtroom or Article III judges.  Judith Resnik, Migrating,
Morphing, and Vanishing:  The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 799 (2004) (roughly estimating that whereas fed-
eral Article III judges, magistrates, and bankruptcy judges conducted approximately 85,000
trials in 2001, administrative law judges conducted over 700,000 hearings pertaining to
social security, immigration, veterans’ benefits, and employment discrimination, in the same
time frame).
118 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
119 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
120 Mathews, 424 U.S. 319.
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fied;121 dismissal of a medical school student without a formal hearing;122 and
an informal hearing in front of prison personnel or doctors as a means to decide
whether prisoners’ “good-time credits” should be eliminated,123 whether pris-
oners should be transferred from a prison to a mental hospital,124 or whether
prisoners should be administered antipsychotic drugs.125
One of the most relevant Due Process precedents, albeit seventy-five years
old, is Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden.126  In that
case the Court was asked to consider a Minnesota statutory scheme requiring
all state fire insurance policies to provide for compulsory binding arbitration
regarding the amount of losses.  The statute had been challenged on Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection grounds by an insurance company that preferred to
litigate.127  The Court unanimously found that there was no Due Process or
Equal Protection violation in requiring a company to arbitrate rather than liti-
gate the issue of its customer’s scope of loss.  The Court explained:
The Fourteenth Amendment neither implies that all trials must be by jury, nor guar-
antees any particular form or method of state procedure.  In the exercise of that
power and to satisfy a public need, a state may choose the remedy best adapted, in
the legislative judgment, to protect the interests concerned, provided its choice is not
unreasonable or arbitrary, and the procedure it adopts satisfies the constitutional
requirements of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.128
In Glidden, the Court found the mandatory arbitration acceptable in that it was
rational for a state to require that the single issue of the amount of loss be
arbitrated, rather than litigated, in that expert knowledge and speed would be
particularly important to such a dispute.  The Court found that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires an alternative to litigation to be “substantial and effi-
cient,”129 and analogized the required arbitration to non-judicial decisions
already held acceptable with respect to workers’ compensation, condemnation
appraisals, and decisions by boards and commissions.130  While Glidden cer-
tainly could be distinguished from my proposal, in that for example the arbitra-
tion analyzed in that case was limited to valuations and not legal coverage
121 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
122 Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
123 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
124 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
125 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
126 Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931).
127 When the dispute arose between the company and its insured, following a fire loss, the
insured appointed an arbitrator and demanded that the company participate in arbitration.
The company refused to participate, and so the insured, in accordance with the policy, had an
umpire appointed who together with the previously selected arbitrator went on to make an
award. Id. at 155-56.  When the insured then brought a lawsuit to recover the amount of the
award the company asserted in defense that the Minnesota statute requiring use of arbitration
for such claims violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 156.
128 Id. at 158 (citation omitted).
129 Id. at 159.
130 Id. at 159-60 (citing, e.g., Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930) (condemnation
appraisals); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930) (boards and
commissions); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (workers’
compensation)).
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issues, my instinct is that few if any courts would find that the imposition of
“fair,” “substantial,” and “efficient” binding arbitration in lieu of litigation vio-
lates the Due Process Clause.
In addition to the Supreme Court precedents, discussed above, it is inform-
ative to examine lower courts’ analysis of Due Process attacks on mandatory
arbitration.  A number of lower federal and state courts have approved the use
of mandatory arbitration in a variety of contexts.131  One interesting line of
cases finds Congress did not violate the Due Process Clause by requiring dis-
putes over pension plan withdrawal liability to be resolved through
arbitration.132
On the other hand, it is also true that some lower courts have flatly held
that statutorily imposed binding arbitration necessarily violates the Due Process
Clause.133  Some of these decisions cite an older Supreme Court decision,
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations.134  In that 1925
case the Court voided, under the Due Process Clause, a Kansas statute that
required labor disputes in certain areas to be taken to what the Court variously
called “industrial courts” or “arbitration.”135  However, while the decision has
never been directly overruled it appears no longer to be good law in that it
relies on an outmoded interpretation of doctrines involving freedom of con-
131 See, e.g., Guralnick v. Supreme Court, 747 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1990), aff’d, 961 F.2d
209 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that mandatory arbitration of attorney/client fee disputes, at the
client’s option, was permissible under the Due Process Clause, even without opportunity for
appeal to court, in that the attorneys had adequate opportunity for a notice and a hearing
before the arbitrators); Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511 (N.M. 1994) (holding that Due
Process Clause permits mandatory arbitration of discharge claim brought by school
employee, even though arbitrator need not be lawyer nor judge nor apply rules of procedure
nor evidence, but also holding that Due Process mandated opportunity for more substantial
appellate review of arbitrator’s decision than had been afforded by statute).
132 See, e.g., Wash. Star Co. v. Int’l Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729
F.2d 1502, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
1980 (“MPAA”) did not violate due process right to impartial adjudication); Bd. of Trs. of
W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund  v. Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc., 749
F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye &
Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 855 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); see also Peick v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 724 F.2d 1247, 1277 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that MPAA did not unconstitu-
tionally deny right of access to court in that it allowed for minimal judicial review of any
arbitration award).
133 See, e.g., Henderson v. Ugalde, 147 P.2d 490 (Ariz. 1944) (finding that courts declare
coercive arbitration agreements unconstitutional); St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams,
49 Ark. 492 (1887) (noting that legislatures lack power to substitute boards of arbitration for
the courts); Healy v. Onstott, 237 Cal. Rptr. 540 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding that coercive
arbitration is unconstitutional if the parties cannot appeal the arbitor’s decision); People ex
rel. Baldwin v. Haws, 37 Barb. 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1862) (stating in dictum that parties
may not be compelled to arbitrate).
134 Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 267 U.S. 552 (1925); see, e.g.,
Henderson, 147 P.2d 490 (finding that courts declare coercive arbitration agreements uncon-
stitutional); Williams, 49 Ark. 492 (noting that legislatures lack power to substitute boards of
arbitration for the courts); Healy, 237 Cal. Rptr. 540 (finding that coercive arbitration is
unconstitutional if the parties cannot appeal the arbitor’s decision); Baldwin, 37 Barb. 440
(stating in dictum that parties may not be compelled to arbitrate).
135 Charles Wolff Packing Co., 267 U.S. at 561, 569.
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tract.136  Some lower courts have taken a more nuanced position, holding that
statutory imposition of binding arbitration can be acceptable with respect to
certain kinds of disputes, but not others.137
So, what is the bottom line in terms of a Due Process challenge to a statu-
torily imposed arbitration program?  Given the cases discussed above I am rea-
sonably confident that at least so long as the imposed arbitration allowed for
adequate notice, a sufficiently neutral arbitrator, opportunities to obtain some
kind of discovery, and perhaps limited appeal, it would pass Due Process mus-
ter in many courts.138
V. CONCLUSION
When I first started thinking about this project, I viewed it mostly as a
lark.  I initially assumed it would be largely or entirely infeasible to impose
arbitration on companies, but nonetheless thought that explicating the argu-
ments would be fun and possibly useful, for rhetorical purposes.
Having now done the research and more thoroughly thought through the
possibilities of legislative mandatory arbitration, I have come to believe it may
actually be possible for Congress to impose arbitration on companies, at least in
certain limited situations.  So I must now face head-on the question of whether
I actually want to become an advocate of governmental mandatory arbitration.
As I remain somewhat conflicted, I will lay out my thought processes.
The major argument I see in favor of advocating for governmental
mandatory binding arbitration, with an opt out for “little guys,” is that I do
believe it could help create a fairer, more just dispute resolution process than
currently exists in this country.  Offering the option of an arbitration process
that could be cheaper and quicker than litigation might help provide greater
access.  Because the program would be purely voluntary, at the option of the
“little guys,” it could only improve and not worsen their chances of obtaining
procedural and substantive justice.
A second factor in my considerations is that I believe, as a matter of real-
politik, that the chances of Congress adopting the sort of mandatory arbitration
discussed here are slim.  Even assuming a Democratic resurgence in 2008, cor-
136 See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, §§ 11.3-11.4, at 442-58 (discussing
demise of substantive due process doctrines based on such cases as Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), and their replacement with an attitude of great latitude towards social
and economic legislation).
137 See, e.g., Bayscene Resident Negotiators v. Bayscene Mobilehome Park, 18 Cal. Rptr.
2d 626, 633-36 (Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that mandatory governmental arbitration can be
appropriate when limited to contractual disputes with government agencies, disputes involv-
ing certain highly regulated industries, or to situations where the rights to be arbitrated have
been created by federal statute, but asserting that mandating arbitration of rent control dis-
putes is unconstitutional because statute does not allow for substantial judicial review of
arbitrators’ decisions).
138 See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory:  The Constitu-
tional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 534-40 (1989) (asserting that statutorily mandated arbitra-
tion, if properly designed, can satisfy the requirements of Due Process); Richard C. Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity:  A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1050-86 (2000) (spelling out Due Process requirements that
would apply to private arbitration).
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porate lobbyists’ control over Congress will likely remain strong.  A bill that
clearly favors employees and consumers over corporate entities has a low like-
lihood of success, in my cynical view.
Finally, and most important, I fear that by advocating mandatory statutory
binding arbitration, I would undermine the idea that arbitration is desirable only
if it is voluntary.  I and many other opponents of private mandatory arbitration
have frequently asserted that binding arbitration is a fine and indeed desirable
dispute resolution technique, but only so long as it is voluntary.139  In truth, as
discussed earlier, I do feel that a legitimate distinction can be made between
Congress mandating the use of binding arbitration by companies and private
companies mandating the use of binding arbitration by their customers.140  That
is, whereas I staunchly oppose companies’ private imposition of arbitration on
their employees and customers, I see no inherent reason why Congress ought
not to mandate the use of arbitration, just as it currently mandates the use of a
broad array of litigation and administrative processes.141  Nonetheless, were I
now to switch to a more nuanced position, that it is legitimate to mandate arbi-
tration for “big guys” but not “little guys,” I fear that I would undercut the
rhetorical strength of this position.  I also fear that I might undercut support for
bills, such as the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007,142 that would explicitly
proscribe companies from imposing arbitration on their customers and
employees.
Thus, because the chances of passing legislation of the sort discussed
herein are weak, and because advocating such legislation could potentially
backfire rhetorically and be used to support the private mandatory arbitration I
despise, I will at this point refrain from taking the ultimate step of advocating
governmental mandatory arbitration.  I will, however, take every chance I get
to turn the rhetorical tables on advocates of private mandatory arbitration.  If
they truly think mandatory arbitration is necessary, to improve access to justice,
it should be mandatory arbitration imposed on the company, and not on the
“little guy.”
139 Professor Richard Reuben urges that the democratic pedigree of arbitration hinges on
whether the process is agreed to voluntarily.  Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute
Resolution:  The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 282 (2004)
(urging that while “[a]s a dispute-resolution process, arbitration is generally undemocratic,
. . . it acquires democratic legitimacy when parties actually agree to arbitrate their disputes
because it furthers the unifying democratic value of personal autonomy”); see also Cliff
Palefsky, Only a Start:  ADR Provider Ethics Principles Don’t Go Far Enough, DISP. RES.
MAG., Spring 2001, at 18 (arguing, more generally, that arbitration is a good process, but
only if it is voluntary).
140 See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
141 For further amplification of my views, see Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration,
supra note 10, at 1670-72.
142 See supra note 12.
